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11 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Proposed Reorganization of the Office of Security

REFERENCE : Memorandum from the IG for the DD/M&S, dated 30 May 73, same subject

1. The following are comments and observations of the Task Force concerning reference memorandum. These comments are keyed to the paragraphs in that memorandum:

Para. 5:

As a result of numerous functions being merged or abolished under the Office of Security's proposed reorganizational plan, the supporting grade structure was developed with the understanding that subsequent approval of the Personnel Management and Compensation Division would be required. Consideration was also given to the need for remaining within the authorized average grade level for the Office as well as maintaining an equal balance, insofar as possible, within the overall grade structure.

With respect to the abolishment of supergrade positions, the Office of Security reduced three (3) supergrade positions as directed by the ADDS on 12 March 1973 and in addition, further recommended abolishment of one additional supergrade position under the proposed

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reorganization for a total of four (4) positions. This represents a reduction in supergrade positions within the Office of Security during the past several months.

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Para. 6:

On 30 June 1973, in consonance with DDS directives, the Office reduced its 1974 ceiling by

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categories. We believe this reduction as well as the reductions recommended in our proposed reorganization leaves a satisfactory balance in our overall grade structure. We will be more than pleased for additional increases in the GS-14 grade level and are looking forward to an early review of our proposed plan by PMCD/OP.

Para. 7:

With reference to paragraph 7, we believe the IG attempts to attribute functions to the Information Handling Security Group which were not assigned by the Task Force. There is also the suggestion that Information Handling Security Group is a misleading term and a recommendation that the title be changed to ADP Security Group. The present title apparently is misleading and we suggest a change to Information Systems Security Group.

Para. 8:

With respect to the Top Secret Control function, we believe that control procedures for documents are analogous to control procedures for information

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contained on computer storage media, such as the audit trail program. There is, therefore, a good case for assigning the Top Secret control function to this group.

Para. 9:

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The Compartmented Information Branch (CIB), with a staff of [REDACTED] people, cannot absorb additional responsibilities.

The SPECLE (Special Clearance Evaluation) System is a dynamic system averaging more than 10,500 add, delete, and/or change actions a month (this fiscal year) to remain current and serve the needs of the entire Intelligence Community. In addition to these actions an average of 32 machine runs are distributed, 22,588 names searched and clearance information relayed, 1,206 cable actions prepared, and 186 briefings and debriefings conducted each month.

An additional function in CIB of the magnitude of TOP SECRET clearance certification of CIA clearances would require a considerable increase in the CIB staff and space, add to the present input and output work load in the SPECLE System, require additional remote terminals, and necessitate some programming changes. This would be a costly addition to existing CIB functions. It is believed that the number of overall inquiries, if not overwhelming, would result in decreased efficiency.

Further, the Certification Section of the Industrial and Certification Branch will be charged with responsibilities which transcend mere record keeping. That

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section will also handle VNE badge requests, special clearance actions for staff employees and employees of non-USIB agencies, and perhaps liaison approvals. All these functions require analysis of files and mature judgement.

Para. 10:

A GS-14 Security Officer is being proposed to work out of the office of the Chief of Operations, Personnel Security and Investigations Directorate. His basic function is to be the [REDACTED] Coordinator for providing guidance and support on behalf of the DD/PSI to [REDACTED]

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We do not agree that all communications to and from the field should flow through one unit. This would create an uncommon delay and bottleneck and thwart our efforts to reduce investigative time. A central control unit would not affect the overloading of some offices, primarily because work requirements flow to field offices based on requirements in specific locations. Leads to offices cannot be re-directed because of work load; other methods of augmenting staffs in the field must be employed that wouldn't necessarily be solved by having a control unit.

Communications to the field flow through IOS now and will flow through PSI after reorganization. The fact that SR&CD controls the mechanics of the KW-7 network and the mail pouch system does not infer anyone can send communications to the field. All administrative support communications are currently channeled through the office of the DDS/IOS, and a problem does not exist in this regard. All other communications originate within the Investigations

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Division or Operational Support Division elements as necessary.

Para. 11:

The Special Assistants to the Chief, Personnel Security Division, are being proposed for inclusion in the Operations Support Branch based on their long and continuing close relationship with the current Support Branch of the Operational Support Division.

The Operations Support Branch is so named to distinguish it from the "administrative" support function and because it does perform a heavy workload for the DD/O. It also however has been active in providing general investigative and support assistance through the field office structure and aids in employee-related problems. It is a quick reaction-oriented unit, and the work of the Special Assistants is best served within the Operations Support Branch.

We do not agree that the External Activities Branch be renamed the Employee Activities Branch. With the proposed consolidation of the current Employee Activities Branch and Special Activities Branch into the External Activities Branch, such other functions not truly employee-related as the

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consistent with captioning it Employee Activities Branch.

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Para. 12:

The Task Force agrees with the IG that essential functions of SRS should be continued, although the ultimate location of these functions may be in components other than the Research Branch.

Para. 13:

The Case Analysis Branch (CAB) provides a service to clearance action officials by collecting, reviewing and summarizing pertinent information contained in Security files and by eliminating nonpertinent information as a result of file reviews. The personnel of CAB perform the first professional examination of all types of new cases submitted to the Office of Security for TOP SECRET security clearance or full field investigation.

The CAB is physically located within SR&CD space to facilitate case processing. New cases and related files are reviewed without delay which would be caused by movement from one office to another and reference files are returned to shelf filing equipment on a same-day basis to be available to other OS personnel. The CAB review within SR&CD results in there being no file accountability problems for other offices. If new cases and related files (an average of 12 files per case) were forwarded to other offices, a same-day review would be necessary or safes would be required to secure the files

Personnel of CAB perform functions other than reviewing new cases and Security files. CAB is responsible for initiating ISD checks and reviewing ISD documents, summarizing information in Security files on individuals, groups or organizations of Security interest, participating in the Files Retirement Program,

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and compiling a data bank on unauthorized "leaks" of intelligence information.

There is little duplication of CAB's work. Any duplication would be limited to the review of papers in the new case file and possibly the file of a close relative.

2. The Task Force would be happy to provide additional information or rebuttal to the IG Report should you desire.

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Coordinated in Draft

Chief
Personnel Security Division

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Chief
Administration and Training Staff

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Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security

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SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Office of Security

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**Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security**

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**Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Investigations and Operational Support**

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Acting Executive Officer

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